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Abstract 
Previous research has shown that performing joint actions can lead to the representation of 
both one’s own and others’ actions. In the present study we explored the influence of co-
representation on response stopping. Are joint actions more difficult to stop than solo 
actions? Using a variation of the stop-signal task, we found that participants needed more 
time to stop a planned joint action compared to a planned solo action (Experiment 1). This 
effect was not observed when participants performed the task in the presence of a passive 
observer (Experiment 2).  A third transcranial magnetic stimulation experiment (Experiment 
3) demonstrated that joint stopping recruited a more selective suppression mechanism than 
solo stopping. Taken together these results suggest that participants used a global inhibition 
mechanism when acting alone; however, they recruited a more selective and slower 
suppression mechanism when acting with someone else.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 
Many every-day activities require the ability to efficiently adjust and coordinate actions 
with others to achieve a common goal (Sebanz et al., 2006). Lifting a table up a narrow 
staircase, singing a duet or shaking hands are prime examples of what can be referred to as 
shared cooperative activities (Bratman, 1992) or joint actions (Sebanz et al., 2006).  
Previous research has shown that performing joint actions can lead to the representation 
of both one’s own and others’ actions. This occurs, for example, when the two stimulus-
response mappings of a two-choice task are distributed between two actors. Even when there 
is no need to take the other’s mapping into account to perform the instructed task, a response 
conflict is observed when a task-irrelevant aspect of a stimulus activates a response 
corresponding to the task-relevant response of the other actor (Sebanz et al., 2003). In line 
with ideomotor theories (Greenwald, 1970; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999; Prinz, 1997), this has 
been taken to suggest that in planning joint actions, participants form task representations that 
specify not only their own part, but also the part to be performed by the co-actor (Sebanz et 
al., 2003; Sebanz et al., 2005). The action alternatives at the other’s disposal might become 
represented in a functionally similar way as their own and have a specific impact on their 
own acting (for a review see Sebanz et al., 2006).  
Co-representation of others’ actions during coordinated planning has been shown to 
influence stimulus processing (Heed et al., 2010), action monitoring (Schuch & Tipper, 
2007), control (Sebanz et al., 2006; Tsai et al., 2006), and prediction processes during the 
ensuing interaction (Ramnani & Miall, 2004; for review see Knoblich et al., 2011). A far less 
explored issue is whether co-representation also influences task performance when people are 
asked to stop rather than to perform a joint action.  
 
 
  
Joint action inhibition: the stop-signal paradigm 
 A useful tool for studying the processes involved in stopping a motor response is the 
stop-signal paradigm (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966), a choice reaction time (RT) task which asks 
participants to occasionally withhold their ongoing response when a stop-signal appears. 
Performance in the stop-signal paradigm is modelled as a race between a ‘go process’, 
triggered by the presentation of the Go stimulus, and a ‘stop process’, triggered by the 
presentation of the Stop stimulus (Logan, 1981; Logan & Cowan, 1984; for a review see 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). According to the race model, only when the cognitive process 
triggered by the Stop signal terminates before the end of the ‘go’ cognitive process, can 
participants correctly suppress their movement. By constantly modifying the latency between 
the Go signal and the Stop signal in a way that the overall movement prevention probability 
is approximately 50%, the latency of the stop process (stop-signal reaction time; SSRT) can 
be estimated (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Ollman, 1973; Logan, 1981). Here we adapted the 
stop-signal paradigm to determine whether and how performing the task with someone else 
influences the stopping processes. In two experiments, participants performed the stop-signal 
task alone (Solo condition) and alongside a co-actor (Joint condition). In Experiment 1, we 
used a variation of the stop-signal task to behaviourally dissociate solo and joint stopping. In 
Experiment 2, using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we probed whether solo 
stopping and joint stopping recruit different neural mechanisms of movement suppression. 
We tested our results against three hypotheses. 
No effect on stopping. First, as the co-actor’s task was irrelevant (see below), the co-
actor’s actions may be not represented at all and may therefore exert no influence on the 
participant’s performance. If so, performance should be the same in the Solo and in the Joint 
conditions.  
  
Non-specific effect of social facilitation. Second, in line with social facilitation, the 
mere presence of a co-actor may exert a general effect on task performance (e.g., Aiello & 
Douthitt, 2001). It has been shown, for example, that when participants are engaged in a 
dialogue, social facilitation can increase alertness and counter the effects of sleep deprivation 
(Bard et al., 1996). Social facilitation effects are not moderated by the specific actions carried 
out by others. Rather, the mere presence of others often leads to similar effects as when a 
group of individuals engage in the same actions (Bond & Titus, 1983). Under this account, a 
non-specific effect of the other’s presence should thus be expected.  
Specific effect of action co-representation. Finally, in line with the joint action 
literature, it is possible that the participants represent the other’s specific task demands, even 
when the co-actor’s task is irrelevant (Sebanz et al., 2003; Sebanz et al., 2005). Such 
representation would create an additional task set in which the stimuli are associated with the 
co-actor’s responses: that is, the Go stimulus would now activate representations of both the 
participant’s responses and those of the co-actor. In this case, on stop-signal trials, 
participants may require a more selective mechanism to control their own responses 
independently of those of the co-actor (Aron, 2011). As selective stopping has been shown to 
be slower than global stopping (e.g. Claffey et al., 2010; Coxon et al., 2007; Majid et al., 
2012; for a review see Stinear et al., 2009), one would expect that the time which participants 
require to stop their response is lengthened in the joint condition compared to the individual 
condition. In line with this account, the distinctive finding would thus be that stopping is 
more selective and also slower when performing the task alongside a co-actor than when 
performing the task alone.  
 
 
 
  
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 we used the stop-signal paradigm to behaviourally dissociate solo 
stopping and joint stopping. Participants were asked to perform a choice RT task alone (Solo 
condition) and alongside a co-actor (Joint condition). In this task they had to respond to a 
target (i.e. press either a left or a right key depending on the stimulus shape) as quickly as 
possible. Occasionally, the target stimulus was followed by an auditory tone which served as 
a Stop signal. We measured the speed with which participants stopped their response, i.e., the 
stop signal reaction time (SSRT). SSRT represents the time interval between the start and the 
end of the stopping process and can be estimated on the basis of the RT distribution observed 
on no-signal trials (Go RT) and the probability of responding during stop-signal trials 
observed for a given stop-signal delay (SSD) (for a review, see Logan, 1994). If the presence 
of the co-actor facilitates performance in a general way, then we would expect a general 
speeding up of both go and stop processes. In contrast, if co-representation specifically 
influences stopping, then we would expect SSRT to be longer in the Joint condition than in 
the Solo condition.  
 
Material and Methods 
Participants. Twelve healthy participants (8 female; aged 21-34 years, mean age = 25.58) 
with no history of neurological or hearing problems took part in the experiment. They were 
all right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Before the experimental 
session each participant was naïve as to the purposes of the study and signed an informed 
consent; information about the experimental hypothesis was given only at the end of the 
experiment. The experimental procedures for both experiments were approved by the local 
Ethics Committee and were carried out in accordance with the principles of the revised 
Helsinki Declaration (World Medical Associations General Assembly, 2008). 
  
 
Task and Procedure. Participants performed a standard stop-signal task (based on 
Verbruggen et al., 2008). Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch monitor (1600 x 900 pixels, 
refresh frequency, 60 Hz) at a viewing distance of 70 cm. Participants were seated in a 
comfortable chair, with their left and right index fingers on the ‘A’ and ‘L’ keys of a standard 
keyboard. Each participant performed the stop-signal task alone (Solo condition) and 
alongside a female experimenter acting as a co-actor (Joint condition). In the Joint condition 
the participant and the co-actor sat side-by-side in front of the monitor with a distance of 
about 40 cm between them. In the Solo condition, the chair next to the participant remained 
empty. The monitor was equidistant from the two chairs. Task and procedure were identical 
in the Solo and in the Joint conditions, except that in the Joint condition instructions required 
both agents to perform the task. The co-actor was introduced to the participant as another 
participant. The participant was told that the co-actor would complete the solo part of the 
experiment at another time. Participants were not required to pay attention to or to coordinate 
their actions with those of the co-actor. 
Each trial began with a white fixation cross lasting 250 ms, followed by the imperative 
Go signal. The Go signal was either a white circle or square. Participants were instructed to 
press the ‘A’ key for the circle, and the ‘L’ key for the square. They were asked to respond to 
the Go signal as fast and accurately as possible. Stimuli remained on the screen until a 
response was made, or until 1250 ms had elapsed. In 25% of trials (Stop trials), the 
imperative Go signal was suddenly followed by an auditory Stop signal (750 Hz, 75 ms), 24 
times for the circle and 24 times for the square, instructing participants to withhold their 
responses. The Stop signal was presented after a variable delay (SSD) initially set at 250 ms. 
The SSD was adjusted continuously with the staircase converging tracking procedure (Band 
et al., 2003): when stopping succeeded, SSD increased by 50 ms; when stopping failed, SSD 
  
decreased by 50 ms. This tracking procedure yields a probability of .50 of stopping to a stop 
signal [p(stop|signal); p(S|S)] (Levitt, 1971). In both the Solo and the Joint condition the 
tracking procedure was based on the actual participant responses so that the SSD was 
exclusively adapted to follow the participant’s performance. The SSRT was calculated using 
the integration method: for each participant, each SSD was subtracted from the nth RT, where 
n is the number of RTs in the RT distribution multiplied by the overall probability of 
responding at a given delay [p(respond|signal); p(R|S)]. Thus, SSRT was estimated for every 
SSD and was then averaged across SSDs. (Verbruggen et al., 2013; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2009). The intertrial interval (ITI) lasted 2000 ms. Each condition (Solo and Joint) consisted 
of 192 randomly presented trials (144 Go trials and 48 Stop trials) equally distributed across 
four mini blocks of 48 trials each. Before each condition, participants completed a practice 
phase, in which they were presented with 32 trials (24 Go and 8 Stop). The order of the Solo 
and Joint conditions was counter-balanced across participants. The experiment lasted 
approximately 25 minutes. 
 
Data analysis. The accuracy of Go trials, the mean RT of correct Go trials (Go RT), the 
probability of stopping [p(S|S)], the mean SSD, and the SSRT were calculated separately for 
both the Solo and Joint conditions. One sample t-tests revealed that the p(S|S) was not 
significantly different from .50 in both the Solo (t11 = -0.966, p= .355) and the Joint (t11 = -
1.401, p= .189) conditions, indicating that the staircase converging tracking procedure was 
successful.  
Paired t-tests (2-tailed) on the above indices were performed to ascertain whether there 
were significant differences between the Solo and Joint conditions. 
 
 
  
Results 
Table 1 summarizes the key measures for both conditions. Participants required more 
time to stop an initiated response when they performed the task alongside another person. 
The SSRT was significantly longer (t11 = -2.470, p=.031) in the Joint condition compared to 
the Solo condition. Similarly, the SSD was significantly shorter in the Joint condition 
compared to the Solo condition (t11 = -2.996, p=.012). In contrast, no difference in Go RTs 
was observed between the Solo and Joint conditions (t11= 0.722, p= .457). Relative to our 
predictions, this finding of a longer latency of the stopping process in the Joint condition 
compared to the Solo condition is compatible with the hypothesis that in the Joint condition, 
participants represented the other’s responses as well as their own, and were thus induced to 
use a more selective, but slower mechanism to stop their own response.  
 
Experiment 2 
A potentially relevant difference between the Joint condition and Solo condition was 
the presence versus absence of a person sitting next to the participant. This difference, rather 
than action co-representation, could be the source of the longer SSRT obtained in Experiment 
1. To rule out this possibility, in Experiment 2 we asked participants to perform the stop-
signal paradigm alone or in the presence of a passive observer. If the mere presence of 
another person is responsible for the effect, then a longer SSRT should also be obtained when 
the passive observer was seated next to the participant. In contrast, if stopping is specifically 
influenced by the co-actor’s responses, then no effect on the stopping process should be 
expected. 
 
 
 
  
Material and Methods 
Participants. Twelve new healthy participants (7 female; aged 20-27 years, mean age = 
23.17) with no history of neurological or hearing problems took part in the experiment. They 
were all right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were naïve 
as to the purpose of the study and signed an informed consent; information about the 
experimental hypothesis was given only at the end of the experiment.  
 
Task, Procedure and Data Analysis. Task, procedure, and data analysis were the same as 
those used in Experiment 1 except that here participants performed the stop-signal task alone 
(Solo condition) and alongside a passive observer (Passive observer condition) who sat 
beside them without acting. As in Experiment 1, participants were told that the co-actor 
would complete the Solo part of the experiment at another time.  
 
Results 
One sample t-tests revealed that the p(S|S) was not significantly different from .50 in 
both the Solo (t11 = 0.581, p= .573) and the Passive observer (t11 = 1.239, p= .241) 
conditions, indicating that the staircase converging tracking procedure was successful.  
Paired t-tests (2-tailed) on the Go RT (t11 = 0.234, p=.819), the SSRT (t11 = 0.155, 
p=.879), and the SSD (t11 = 0.050, p=.961) revealed no differences between the Solo and the 
Passive observer conditions. This indicates that the mere presence vs. absence of a person 
sitting next to the participant was not sufficient to influence task performance.  
  
Experiment 3 
The finding of a longer latency of the stopping process when participants performed the 
task alongside a co-actor (Experiment 1), but not when they performed the task in the 
  
presence of a passive observer (Experiment 2) is compatible with the hypothesis that in the 
Joint condition, participants represented the other’s responses as well as their own, and were 
thus induced to use a more selective, but slower mechanism to stop their own response. 
However, differences in SSRT do not prove on their own that a more selective mechanism 
was engaged during joint stopping (Aron & Verbruggen, 2008). To obtain a direct measure of 
the selectivity of the joint stopping mechanism, in a third TMS experiment, we measured the 
corticospinal modulation of a task-irrelevant muscle during the stop-signal task. 
When a global mechanism is used to stop the hand, ‘widespread pulses’ inhibit the 
motor system generally and a significant decrease in excitability is observed not only in the 
hand muscle, but also in task-irrelevant effectors (Badry et al., 2009). Consistent with this, 
Majid and colleagues (2012) demonstrated that for standard, non-selective stopping, stopping 
the hand led to suppression of a task-irrelevant leg muscle. This diffuse suppression effect 
was not observed when participants were required to stop selectively, i.e., when they were 
cued in advance about which response to stop. 
Following the same logic, in Experiment 3 we used TMS to probe the corticospinal 
excitability of a task-irrelevant leg muscle while participants performed a stop-signal task 
alone or alongside a co-actor. We treated task-irrelevant leg suppression as a ‘TMS signature’ 
of global versus selective stopping. We predicted that if joint stopping engages a more 
selective mechanism, then stopping should be slower and leg suppression reduced (i.e. 
corticospinal excitability should be greater) for the Joint compared to the Solo condition. 
Such a result would corroborate the hypothesis that a different suppression mechanism is 
recruited for jointly performed actions relative to individually performed actions. 
 
 
 
  
Materials and Methods 
Participants. Twenty-one new healthy volunteers (16 female) aged 18-31 (mean 21.8) took 
part in Experiment 3. All were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity 
and were free from any contraindication to TMS (Wassermann, 1998; Rossi, Hallett, Rossini, 
& Pascual-Leone, 2009). Before the experimental session each participant was naïve as to the 
purposes of the study and signed an informed consent; information about the experimental 
hypothesis was given only at the end of the experiment. Participants were financially 
compensated for their time. None experienced discomfort during TMS. 
 
Task and Procedure. Participants performed a TMS-adapted version (based on Majid et al., 
2012) of the standard stop-signal task. Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch monitor 
(resolution 1280 x 1024 pixels, refresh frequency, 60 Hz) at a viewing distance of 90 cm. A 
chinrest was used to provide support and minimise head movements during TMS. Each trial 
began with a 500 ms yellow fixation cross, followed by a 500 ms blank screen. The 
imperative Go signal (circle: ‘A’ response; square: ‘L’ response) was then presented. On Go 
trials (67% of all trials), the Go signal remained on the screen until a response was made, or 
until 900 ms had elapsed (Figure 1A). On Stop trials (33% of all trials) a red cross Stop signal 
appeared 35 times over the circle and 35 times over the square indicating that the participant 
and co-actor should withhold their responses. The Stop signal remained on the monitor until 
the end of the trial (Figure 1B). As in Experiment 1 and 2, the SSD was initially set at 250 ms 
and was then adjusted continuously with the staircase converging tracking procedure (Band et 
al., 2003). The SSD was calculated based on the participant’s responses. The ITI ranged from 
4 to 6 s (mean 5 s). The experimental procedure was divided into 3 sessions: i) ‘Practice’ 
without TMS; ii) ‘Solo’ condition; and iii) ‘Joint’ condition. For each participant, in order to 
calculate the timing of the TMS pulse, the experiment started with the Practice session (66 
  
trials; 44 Go and 22 Stop) in which the co-actor was not present. After the Practice, the Solo 
and the Joint conditions (each including two blocks of 105 trials; 70 Go and 35 Stop) were 
run in a counterbalanced order across participants. TMS pulses were delivered on 90 out of 
105 trials in each block (60 Go trials and 30 Stop trials) during the response period calculated 
by subtracting 100 ms from mean Go RT obtained during the Practice session (Training Go 
RT - 100 ms; Badry et al., 2009; Majid et al., 2012). 15 additional motor evoked potentials 
(MEPs) were recorded 300 ms before the onset of the Go signal for 10 Go trials and 5 Stop 
trials and served as a baseline for the response period MEPs. The entire experimental 
procedure (Practice, two Solo blocks, two Joint blocks) lasted approximately 100 minutes. 
Stimulus-presentation timing, EMG recording and TMS triggering, as well as stimulus 
randomisation, were controlled by E-Prime V2.0 Software (Psychology Software Tools Inc., 
Pittsburgh, PA, USA) running on a PC. 
 
Electromyographic and TMS Recording. TMS pulses were administered using a Magstim 
Rapid
2
 stimulator (Magstim, Whitlan, Dyfed, Wales, UK) connected to a 70 mm figure-of-
eight coil initially positioned 2 cm anterior to the vertex of the head of the participant (Cz; the 
point half-way between the nasion and the inion) approximately corresponding to the midline 
primary motor cortex (M1) representations of the Tibialis Anterior (TA) muscles. During 
TMS preparation, the coil was positioned in correspondence with the optimal scalp position 
(OSP), defined as the position from which MEPs with maximal amplitude were recorded in 
either of the 2 TA muscles (Majid et al., 2012). To find the individual OSP, the coil was 
moved in steps of 0.5 cm over the motor cortex and the OSP was marked on a bathing cap 
worn by participants. To increase the likelihood of finding the OSP, participants were 
requested to slightly activate their TA muscles by placing their heels on the floor and the toes 
upon a low-rise step. Once the OSP was found, the individual resting motor threshold (rMT) 
  
was determined as the lowest stimulus intensity able to generate MEPs (no less than 50μV 
peak-to-peak amplitude) in five out of ten consecutive TMS pulses (Rossini et al. 1994). Five 
participants were excluded due to difficulty in finding either individual OSP or rMT. During 
the recording sessions, stimulation intensity was 115% of the rMT and it ranged from 53% to 
85% (mean 76.3%) of the maximum stimulator intensity. The OSP was located over the right 
motor cortex (stimulating the left leg) in 13 participants; in 3 participants it was located over 
the left motor cortex (stimulating the right leg). MEPs were recorded from the TA muscles 
(muscles responsible for the feet dorsoflexion) through pairs of Ag-AgCl surface electrodes 
(10 mm diameter) placed over the muscle belly (active electrode) and over the associated 
joint or tendon (reference electrode) in a classical belly-tendon montage. Electrodes were 
connected to an isolated portable ExG input box linked to the main EMG amplifier for signal 
transmission via a twin fiber optic cable (Professional BrainAmp ExG MR, Brain Products, 
Munich, Germany). The ground electrodes were placed over the participants’ lateral malleoli 
of both legs and were connected to the common input of the ExG input box. A notch filter 
(50 Hz) was used and responses were sampled (5000 Hz), amplified, band-pass filtered (3 
Hz-3000 Hz), and stored on a PC for off-line analysis. A prestimulus recording of 100 ms 
was used to check for the presence of EMG activity before the TMS pulse. In order to prevent 
contamination of MEP measurements by background EMG activity, trials with any 
background activity greater than 100 µV in the 100ms window preceding the TMS pulse 
were excluded from the MEP analysis (e.g. Duque & Ivry 2009; Cavallo et al., 2012). EMG 
data were collected for 200 ms after the TMS pulse. 
 
Data analysis. EMG data were analyzed off-line using Brain Vision Analyzer software 
(Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany). Background EMG level prior to TMS was 
checked for each trial. Individual mean peak-to-peak amplitudes of MEPs recorded from TA 
  
muscles were calculated separately for Go and Stop trials. MEP amplitudes deviating more 
than 2 standard deviations (SD) from the mean of each experimental condition (< 2%), single 
trials contaminated by muscular preactivation (< 2%) and Stop trials in which the TMS 
trigger was delivered before the Stop signal (41 out of 1920 trials) were excluded from the 
analysis. Additionally, to ensure that any effect on MEP amplitude was not due to differences 
in background EMG level prior to TMS, the root mean square (rms) EMG obtained from the 
100 ms window before the TMS pulse was calculated. A repeated measure 2 (Solo, Joint) x 2 
(Go, Stop) ANOVA was then performed. Neither main effects [Condition p= .775 (rms Solo 
= 4.49; rms Joint = 4.32); Trial type p= .289 (rms Go = 4.26; rms Stop = 4.54)] nor an 
interaction (Condition x Trial type, p= .242) were observed in the rms data (see Figure S1 for 
a representation of EMG mean activity prior to TMS pulse). 
To allow unbiased comparison between sessions, for each participant, MEP amplitudes 
were converted into a proportion of the baseline value. To simplify data presentation and 
allow comparison across conditions, Stop Ratios, as shown below, were calculated for each 
condition by dividing the baseline normalized mean MEP amplitude of the Stop trials by the 
mean MEP amplitude resulting from the Go trials. 
 
            
               
             
 
 
The lower the value of this index, the stronger the task-irrelevant leg suppression. 
To compare the MEP Stop Ratios for the Solo and the Joint conditions, a paired-
sample t-test (2-tailed) was performed.  
 
 
 
  
Results 
Table 2 summarizes the key measures computed for both the Solo and the Joint 
conditions. As in Experiment 1, SSRT was prolonged (t15 = -2.369, p=.032) for the Joint 
condition compared to the Solo condition. Consistent with our prediction, during Stop trials 
leg suppression was reduced (t15 = -2.372, p=.032) for the Joint relative to the Solo condition 
(Figure 2). Critically, no difference in Go MEPs was observed (t15= .389; p=.352, one tailed), 
therefore excluding the possibility that differences in Stop Ratios may arise from larger Go 
MEP amplitudes in the Solo than Joint condition. 
Taken together, behavioural and TMS data suggest that, compared to the Solo 
condition, participants employed a more selective and slower suppression mechanism when 
responding alongside a co-actor.  
 
Discussion 
The present stop-signal study was designed to test the hypothesis that joint context 
modulates stopping processes. Performing joint actions can lead to the representation of both 
one’s own and others’ actions (e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003). We reasoned that if participants 
represent the stimulus-response mappings of the co-actor alongside their own, then they may 
require a more selective but also slower mechanism to control their own responses when 
performing the task alongside a co-actor. Under this account, stopping should thus be more 
selective and slower in the Joint condition compared to the Solo condition. Experiment 1 
demonstrated that the latency of the stop process (SSRT) was indeed prolonged in the Joint 
condition relative to the Solo condition. This effect was not observed when participants 
performed the task in the presence of a passive observer (Experiment 2). This pattern of 
results is compatible with the hypothesis that participants used a selective mechanism to stop 
when they performed the task together with a co-actor. However, the significant difference in 
  
SSRT obtained in Experiment 1 is not sufficient on its own as evidence that, at a 
neurocognitive level, two different mechanisms of stopping were activated (Aron & 
Verbruggen, 2008). To obtain a direct measure of stopping selectivity in Experiment 3, we 
used TMS to probe the corticospinal excitability of a task-irrelevant leg muscle while 
participants performed a stop-signal task alone or alongside a co-actor. In line with 
predictions, results showed that task-irrelevant leg suppression was significantly reduced for 
the Joint condition compared to the Solo condition. When participants acted alone, stopping 
the hand had global suppressive effects across effectors not related to the task. When they 
performed the stop-signal task alongside a co-actor, they used a more selective mechanism 
that allowed the suppression of a specific response tendency. In combination, the prolonged 
SSRT and the significant reduction in leg suppression provide strong evidence in favour of 
the recruitment of a more selective stopping mechanism in the Joint condition compared to 
the Solo condition.  
 
 
Selective joint stopping 
How was the selective stopping mechanism activated in the Joint condition?  
Recent studies indicate that when people do not have foreknowledge about the particular 
response they may need to prevent, they use a fast-acting stopping mechanism that suppresses 
both the prepared response and other potential responses. However, when they have 
foreknowledge regarding which response they may have to stop, they use a more selective, 
but also slower mechanism (e.g. Claffey et al., 2010; Majid et al., 2012). This occurs, for 
instance, when they are cued in advance about which hand response to stop (“Maybe stop 
right” or “Maybe stop left”): participants represent two response alternatives and selectively 
prepare to stop a specific response (e.g. Aron & Verbruggen, 2008). One possibility therefore 
  
is that in the joint task participants represented separate stimulus-response mappings for each 
agent, and selectively prepared to stop their own response. 
The ideomotor theory predicts that observing somebody perform an action should 
activate corresponding motor representations in the observer and create an action tendency 
(Greenwald, 1970; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999; Prinz, 1997). During a joint stopping task, action 
possibilities at the other’s disposal might thus become represented, influencing the 
mechanism used to stop one’s own response. Participants may be slower to stop their 
response tendency because they use a more selective stopping mechanism to control their 
own action independently of what the co-actor is doing. If this is correct, then one would 
expect joint SSRT to correlate with SSRT as measured in a task requiring selective stopping. 
Moreover, joint stopping may be expected to be even more selective in social conditions that 
emphasize behavioral selectivity, e.g. when the participant and the co-actor have different 
task instructions. This prediction could be tested by using stopping paradigms which require 
one to withhold their action when it is the other’s turn to act.  
An alternative, yet not mutually exclusive, possibility is that participants engaged a 
more selective stopping mechanism when acting alongside the co-actor because the presence 
of the co-actor acted as a reference frame for the spatial coding of their own action. In the 
cued selective stopping task participants are explicitly instructed to prepare to stop a 
particular hand (“Maybe Stop Right” or “Maybe Stop Left”; e.g. Aron & Verbruggen, 2008). 
Similarly to this cueing of the possibility of stopping the left/right hand response, the co-actor 
may provide a spatial frame for referential response coding – just as one’s own action 
alternatives provide a reference frame for relative response coding in two-choice tasks (Dolk 
et al., 2011; Dolk et al., 2013; Guagnano et al., 2010). For instance, when the co-actor’s 
response occurs on the right side, the participant’s response is coded as left. According to this 
referential-coding account, the key enabler of selective stopping in the Joint condition would 
  
thus be the encoding of the participant’s own action with reference to the other person’s 
action. The effect observed in the Joint condition would not be specific for social actions, but 
should be observed for both social action and non-social action events, as long as they 
provide a spatial reference frame which allows for referential coding. In line with this, Dolk 
and colleagues (2013) recently demonstrated that spatial compatibility effects such as the 
Social Simon effect do not necessarily require social nor movement features to occur, but can 
be elicited by any event salient enough to draw spatial attention. Studies modifying the social 
nature of the stop-task situation – in terms of both action and procedural characteristics – may 
help to clarify whether in the absence of foreknowledge cues, co-representation of a human 
co-actor’s action is necessary for a transition from global to selective inhibition to occur. 
 
What are the neural mechanisms for joint stopping?  
Modulation of leg suppression in Experiment 3 indicates that stopping the hand had 
global suppressive effects when acting alone, but not when acting alongside a co-actor. When 
combined with previous evidence, we speculate that this finding argues in favour of two 
different neural mechanisms for stopping. Global stopping has been proposed to engage a 
hyperdirect neural pathway characterized by fast and direct projections from the cortex (i.e., 
right inferior frontal cortex and presupplementary motor area) to the subthalamic nucleus of 
the basal ganglia (Aron et al., 2007; Aron & Poldrack 2006). The subthalamic nucleus is a 
deep brain structure with diffuse excitatory projections to output nuclei of the basal ganglia 
(including the globus pallidus pars interna), which, in turn, exert a diffuse inhibitory 
influence over M1 via the thalamus. Therefore, recruitment of the subthalamic nucleus could 
result in the rapid suppression of activity throughout the motor system. 
In contrast to the proposed global stopping mechanism, selective stopping may 
instead be implemented via an indirect pathway from the striatum to the globus pallidus pars 
  
externa and then to the globus pallidus pars interna. The termination pattern of striatal 
neurons onto the globus pallidus pars interna, and from globus pallidus pars externa to the 
globus pallidus pars interna has a very focused effect and may therefore lead to suppression 
of specific representations in M1 (for a review of neural systems underlying motor stopping 
see Aron, 2011; Jahfari et al., 2012, 2011; Chikazoe, 2010; Chambers et al., 2009; Eagle et 
al., 2008).  
Cued stopping when participants have foreknowledge about which response they may 
need to stop has been proposed to target the motor system via the slower, indirect pathway. 
The current results provide further evidence for different modes of stopping, a global 
mechanism and a selective one, and suggest that a more selective pathway may be used not 
only when participants are cued in advance about which response to stop, but also when they 
act alongside another person. While future studies will be necessary to clarify whether joint 
stopping is implemented via the same fronto-striatal-pallidal pathway involved in cued 
stopping, these results provide novel insights into the circumstances which may activate 
global versus selective mechanisms in the stopping of action. 
 
Conclusions 
Acting together requires the recruitment of control processes which ensure joint 
stopping of action. Our results provide the first demonstration that the social context exerts a 
specific influence on the mechanisms underlying stopping. Participants use a fast global 
inhibition mechanism when acting alone; however, they recruit a more selective and slower 
stopping mechanism when acting with someone else. These findings motivate a richer model 
of how people control their inappropriate response tendencies and suggest that joint stopping 
and solo stopping recruit different suppression mechanisms.  
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Table 1. Experiment 1: comparison between Solo and Joint conditions 
 Solo Joint 
Go trials accuracy (%) .983 ± .022 .976 ± .022 
Probability of stopping p(S|S) .495 ± .055 .487 ± .056 
Go RT (ms) 508 ± 79 501 ± 73 
SSD (ms)* 291 ± 73 251 ± 60 
SSRT (ms)* 231 ± 50 267 ± 59 
 
Behavioural indices obtained from Experiment 1. All values represent mean ± standard 
deviation. Asterisks indicate significant differences between conditions (p < .05) 
 
Table 2. Experiment 3: comparison between Solo and Joint conditions 
 Solo Joint 
Go trials accuracy (%) .955 ± .030 .954 ± .037 
Probability of stopping p(S|S) .524 ± .060 .515 ± .049 
Go RT (ms) 420 ± 72 434 ± 59 
SSD (ms) 157 ± 69 165 ± 63 
SSRT (ms)* 
MEP Stop Ratio* 
279 ± 52 
.97 ± .13 
310 ± 55 
1.05 ± .11 
 
Behavioural and EMG indices obtained from Experiment 3. All values represent mean ± 
standard deviation. Asterisks indicate significant differences between conditions (p < .05) 
  
  
Figure legends 
Figure 1. Example of experimental procedure for Experiment 3. Each trial began with a 500 
ms fixation cross, followed by a 500 ms blank screen. The imperative Go signal was then 
presented. On Go trials (A) the Go signal remained on the screen until participants responded, 
or until 900 ms had elapsed. On Stop trials (B), following a variable SSD, a red cross Stop 
signal appeared over the circle/square indicating participants to withhold their responses and 
this remained on the monitor for the duration of the trial. The SSD was initially set at 250 ms 
and was then adjusted continuously with the staircase converging tracking procedure. The 
timing of the TMS pulse was calculated by subtracting 100 ms from mean Go RT obtained 
during the Practice session. 15 additional MEPs (TMS pulse, baseline) were recorded 300 ms 
before the onset of the Go signal for 10 Go trials and 5 Stop trials and served as a baseline. 
 
Figure 2. (A) Peak-to-peak amplitude scores recorded from TA muscles during Solo and Joint 
conditions. MEP amplitudes are expressed as a Stop Ratio ± s.e.m. calculated for each 
condition by dividing the mean MEP amplitude of the Stop trials by the mean MEP 
amplitude resulting from the Go trials. (B) Individual MEP Stop Ratio difference was 
calculated for each participant by subtracting the MEP Stop Ratio of the Joint condition from 
the MEP Stop Ratio of the Solo condition.  
